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1. Introduction
Principles of selection in this bibliography
The literature on political Islam in the Occupied Territories is extensive.
Unfortunately, much of this literature is only available in Arabic or Hebrew,
and hence inaccessible to the average Western reader. This bibliography
presents an overview of selected material in English relating to the phenomenon
of Islamist movements in the Occupied Territories. It is comprehensive, but not
complete. The bibliography contains 60 abstracted works, and references to 10
additional works that have been unavailable at the time of writing. I have
excluded material that does not significantly add to our knowledge of the
phenomenon. For various reasons, some titles have been unavailable to the
author of this bibliography at the time of compiling it. These are listed at the
end of the bibliography. PhD dissertations on the topic, of which there appears
to be a substantial number, have for instance not been included.
The intersection of military and academic interests in the field of
political Islam is often articulated in rather stereotypical studies of Palestinian
political Islam based on secondary sources. I see the academic task as a
descriptive rather than a normative one, and would therefore concur in Hroub’s
view that the phenomena of the Palestinian Islamist movement require to be
understood (Hroub 2000: 3). It is to be hoped that the use of multiple sources
may contribute to a more multidimensional understanding of Palestinian
Islamism. In the abstracts, I have chosen to emphasise parts of the specific work
cited that suggest motives for the emergence of a Palestinian political Islam.
Introduction
The outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising in the Occupied Territories of the
West Bank and Gaza in December 1987 signalled a challenge to the Palestinian
secular nationalist leadership in exile on two fronts: firstly, by an indigenous
leadership of young activists in Fatah; and secondly, by local activists with an
Islamic orientation. There is general consensus that activists from Islamic Jihad
(Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami’) prepared the ground for the spontaneous revolt that
came to be known as the Intifada by mounting a military campaign in Gaza in
the months prior to the outbreak of the upraising. A few days into the Intifada,
a group called the Islamic Resistance Movement, later known by its acronym
Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), was launched. Islamic Jihad and
Hamas had a common ancestry. Islamic Jihad and Hamas were established by
members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Occupied Territories. Islamic Jihad
was established in 1981 as a splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood,
whereas Hamas was established in 1987 by Muslim Brotherhood leaders from
Gaza.
The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, an offspring of Hassan al-Banna’s
Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in Egypt, had been present in
Palestine since the 1930s. Former members of the Brotherhood were central in
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the establishment of the Fatah faction of the secular-nationalist PLO in the
1960s.
During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israeli military forces occupied Gaza
and the West Bank. Opposition to the occupation mainly came from Palestinian
nationalists. In the shadow of the occupation, the Palestinian Islamist
movement increased its support among Palestinians through a growing number
of mosques, educational institutions and charitable associations.
The Israeli civil and military administration in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories turned a blind eye to this development, since it undermined support
in the Palestinian population for the nationalists. Israeli authorities saw the
Muslim Brotherhood as less menacing than the secular forces of Palestinian
nationalism, since the former did not engage in any violent resistance against
the occupation. In fact, among Palestinians the Muslim Brotherhood was in the
1960s and 70s discredited due to their non-commitment to armed resistance.
The tables have now turned. Popular discontent with the lack of progress
in the quest for an independent Palestinian state, with a corrupt and autocratic
Palestinian Authority, and with expanding Israeli settlements led to the eruption
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 (Shikaki 2002). More than the other
political factions in Palestinian society, the Islamists have capitalised on the
breakdown of the Oslo process.  Opinion polls have indicated widespread
support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians among the Palestinian
population.
Defining Islamism/Political Islam
Even if it has become commonplace to describe certain contemporary
movements in the Muslim world as expressions of political Islam or Islamism,
precise definitions of the phenomena are rarely found in the academic literature.
It seems that the Israeli Middle East expert Martin Kramer was the first
academic to use the term political Islam in a treatise written in the aftermath of
the Iranian revolution of 1979 (Kramer 1980). Kramer applied the term to any
advocate of an Islamic order in the Muslim world, and therefore mistakenly
lumped together a variety of movements, such as Fatah, the Muslim
Brotherhood of Syria, and the Khomeini regime under the rubric of political
Islam. If one sticks to a minimalist definition of political Islam, in which it is
taken to mean “the religion of Islam as applied to a militant, political purpose”
(Karamé 1996: 199), Kramer’s usage may ring true. Later analysts however
seem to have been more restrictive in the application of the term (Ayubi 1991,
Burgat 2003). The term political Islam is often used interchangeably with terms
like Islamism and/or Islamic fundamentalism. Roy (1994: ix) defines Islamism
as “a contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology”.
The term Islamism may be preferable to the term political Islam, since the latter
term seems to imply a division between politics and religion in the Islamic
tradition, which has never existed.
Esposito (1995: 250) emphasises the importance of local context in
accounting for the variations of political Islam, and points to “recurrent
themes” in political Islam. These recurrent themes are: “the belief that existing
political, economic and social systems [have] failed; a disenchantment with and
at times rejection of the West; a quest for identity and greater authenticity; and
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the conviction that Islam provides a self-sufficient ideology for state and
society, a valid alternative to secular nationalism, socialism and capitalism.”
The aim of most, if not all, movements within political Islam or Islamism, is the
establishment of an Islamic state in which Islamic Law, shari’a, is applied to
every field of society (cfr. Utvik 1993).  This has often brought  these
movements into conflict with secular regimes in the Middle East.
Within political Islam or Islamism, there is a variety of perspectives on
how this change may be effected.  Referring to movements within political
Islam, Kepel (1989) distinguishes between “Islamisation from below” and
“Islamisation from above”. In the former version, the establishment of an
Islamic state is assumed to be the end result of a gradual process of Islamic
revival among the citizens, whereas in the latter version, an overthrow of the
existing regime is the means through which the Islamic state is imposed.  The
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has been central to many Islamist
movements in the Middle East. “Islamisation from below” can be traced back
to Hasan al-Banna, whereas “Islamisation from above” can be traced back to
Sayyid Qutb. Both were members of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, but
they operated under quite different socio-political circumstances.
In the Occupied Territories, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezb al-Tahrir
al-Islami’ (The Islamic Liberation Party, see below) historically gravitated
towards “Islamisation from below”, whilst Islamic Jihad focused on
“Islamisation from above” by means of revolution. Hamas has come to embody
both approaches.
Palestinian Islamists generally appear to constitute an exceptional case in
the literature on political Islamic movements in the Middle East. The violence
perpetrated by Palestinian Islamist movements has not been directed primarily
at secular authorities in their own societies. There is no Palestinian state, only a
provisional authority, hence this stands to reason. The relationship between the
Islamists in Palestine and the Palestinian Authority has however been strained,
and has led to temporary eruptions of internecine violence.  The dominant
narrative, which structures much of the Western academic scholarship on
political Islam in the Middle East, is at present one in which Islamist
movements are perceived as being on the wane throughout the region (cf. Roy
(1994), Kepel (2002)). Roy’s and Kepel’s analyses hinge on a selective
application of elements central to Islamism. Their analyses may be too static
and state-centric. For sure, Islamist movements in the Middle East have
generally failed in assuming state power, establishing an Islamic state and
imposing shari’a. But as a consequence, their strategies and goals have in many
cases changed.
In many Middle Eastern countries, social services are heavily dominated
by Islamists. This ensures popular support for Islamists. This is also the case in
the Palestinian Occupied Territories, where Hamas has provided a modicum of
social security for underprivileged Palestinians (Hroub 2000: 236-238).
Palestinian Islamism: The organisations
For the purposes of this bibliography and in the context of the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, when I refer to Islamism in its organisational form, I am
referring to the following movements:
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(1) The Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas. Hamas was established as a
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in December 1987. Despite active
involvement in the Intifada, Hamas leaders had contacts with the Israeli
civilian administration until early 1989. The Israeli authorities’ perception
of Hamas changed as a result of Hamas’ involvement in the murder of two
Israeli soldiers in April 1989. Hamas was prohibited, and membership
declared illegal by the Israeli authorities in December 1989. Hamas’ military
wing, the Kata’ib al-Shahid ‘Izz ed-Din al-Qassam (Brigades of the Martyr
‘Izz ed-Din al-Qassam), was founded in 1991. The Qassam Brigades carried
out a series of armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers and
assassinations of alleged Palestinian collaborators between 1989 and 1994.
Several hundred members of Hamas were expelled to Israeli-occupied South
Lebanon in 1992. In response to the Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre in Hebron
in February 1994, the Qassam Brigades launched their first suicide bomb
attack targeting Israeli civilians on 6 April 1994 in Afula, Israel, and have
since continued such attacks. Hamas has consistently opposed the Oslo
Accords and the Declaration of Principles on the grounds that the
organisation is opposed to recognition of the state of Israel within the
territory of the historical Palestine. Hamas seeks the establishment of an
Islamic state in Palestine in which shari’a is implemented.
(2) Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad consists of four different groups
that emerged in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the early 1980s. The
largest group, the Shiqaqi-Awda Faction, was founded in 1979 by Fathi
Shiqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda. By 1981 it had established a presence in
Gaza. The Islamic Jihad groups are heavily influenced by the Iranian
revolution, and broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood due to the
reluctance of the latter to engage in military resistance against Israeli
occupation. Islamic Jihad seeks to impose an Islamic state through armed
revolution aimed at ending the Israeli occupation. The militants in Islamic
Jihad conducted a military campaign in the Gaza strip prior to the outbreak
of the Intifada in 1987, took part in the upraising from the first phase, and
suffered severe losses due to Israeli reprisals against its leading cadres. The
external leadership of the Shiqaqi-Awda Faction is based in Damascus,
Syria. Islamic Jihad is opposed to the Oslo Accords and the DoP. It has
limited popular support. The two armed wings of the Islamic Jihad (Kata’ib
Sayf al-Islam al-Quwah al-Islamiyya al-Mujahidah and Saraya al-Quds)
have been responsible for a series of suicide attacks against Israelis since
1994.
(3) The Islamic Liberation Party (Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami’). Founded in 1953
by Sheikh Taqi ad-Din an-Nabahani, a former Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood member from the West Bank town of Tulkaram. The
organisation has never managed to attract mass support in Palestinian
society. It has its strongest base in conservative sectors of Palestinian society,
most significantly in Hebron on the West Bank. The party advances the idea
of a pan-Arab Islamic state (a single Arabic state united under Islam), is
opposed both to the establishment of a Palestinian entity and to the Oslo
Accords and the Declaration of Principles, but has never engaged in armed
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resistance against Israeli occupation. The motivation for this appears to be
that the party regards the emergence of a caliphate as the essential
precondition for engaging in military resistance against ‘infidel’ forces.  The
party is active in several European, African and Asian countries.
A fourth Palestinian Islamist group, Hizb al-Khalas al-Watani al-Islami’ (or
Khalas), which emerged in 1995 and is based in Gaza, has to our knowledge
not been the subject of any academic studies so far, and has therefore been
excluded from this bibliography except for one reference. The same applies to
small groups such as al-Salafiyyun, al-Jam’iyya al-Islam’iyya and al-Jam’iyya al-
Salah al-Islamiyya.
Analysing Islamism in Palestine: The main issues
The so-called “war on terror” has implied that the violent acts perpetrated by
Islamist movements are increasingly seen as reflections of an inherently violent
ideology, rather than as contingent and contextual responses to particular
situations. Parties to the conflict opposed to Israeli and US influence in the
region are to an increasing extent defined as terrorists. Groups and individuals
defined as terrorists are placed outside of the sphere in which human rights
apply, and their human rights are violated through extra-judicial assassinations,
torture and detention without trial.
When analysing the social composition of Islamist groups in the Occupied
Territories, the authors often seem to reproduce the central tenets of Saad
Eddin Ebrahim’s analysis of the social background of ‘Islamic activists’ in
Egypt. In his classic article from 1980, Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic
Groups, Ebrahim found that these activists were predominantly urban,
educated and middle-class to lower-middle-class individuals. In a later
contribution to the literature, Ebrahim indicated that in terms of the social
composition of activist Islamic groups, there had been a shift towards rural,
uneducated and poor individuals in the course of the 1980s (Ebrahim 1995).  In
the case of Palestinian Islamist groups, there is reason to believe that their social
composition is as complex an issue as that of Egyptian Islamic activism. Since
there have been relatively few micro-level studies of Palestinian Islamist
movements thus far (but see Jensen 1998), one does not have sufficient
information about this to draw definite conclusions.
However, it should be noted that grass-roots support for the proponents
of political Islam in the Occupied Palestinian Territories goes beyond the deeply
religious. Hroub (2000: 5) asserts that fluctuations in the balance of power
among Palestinian groups and in their share of public support are contingent on
how well they embody the state of resistance. In other words, the extensive
support for political Islamic movements within Palestinian society in times of
confrontation with the Israeli state does not necessarily tell us anything
significant about the general level of support for the ideology of political Islam
within the Palestinian population.
Nor should the support for Islamism among the Palestinians be regarded
as an index of Palestinian religiosity (cf. Norton 1995). The ideology of
Islamism as applied to the Palestinian situation is not stable, but in constant
flux. The flow of persons between secular-nationalist and Islamist movements is
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documented in the available literature (cf. Rekhess 1990: 196-97), and indicates
that ideology may be of lesser importance to supporters and activists. The
challenge for the Palestinian Islamists in the course of the Oslo process was to
reconcile their utopian aims with the political realities. The internal debate
within Hamas in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords testifies to the potential for
moderation and temporary compromise if and when a political settlement
acceptable to the Palestinian populace is reached. Palestinian Islamists’ acts of
terror against Israeli civilians reveal a highly rational calculus based on the
notion of retaliation. For Palestinian Islamists, violence may indeed seem to be
politics through other means.  The shift towards suicide bombings against
Israeli civilians occurred after the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in Hebron in
1994, and suicide bombings have intensified whenever Palestinian Islamists
have been assassinated by Israeli security forces.
This fact dispels the notion prevalent in much current writing on
Islamism, in which it is argued that violence is inherent in Islamist ideology.
Many of the works included in this bibliography contend that the Palestinian
Islamists’ main interest is in protecting their social and religious institutions.
The PA’s crackdown on this infrastructure in the period between 1996 and
1999, and in particular after the signing of the Wye Accords in 1998, proved
that this was impossible. The Wye Accords obliged the PA to act against the
Palestinian Islamists in order to guarantee the security of Israelis, and thereby
created fractures within PLO/Fatah. Younger Fatah leaders, such as the
imprisoned Marwan Barghouti, were sympathetic to co-operation with the
Islamists. It therefore stands to reason that the Wye Accords may have
contributed significantly to the drift towards the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September
2000.
General observations
In the course of the work on this bibliography, it has become clear that the
study of Islamism or political Islam in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is
dominated by a small segment of academics with similar backgrounds and
characteristics. To an overwhelming extent, the researchers are male, have
Israeli or U.S citizenship, and come from a background in terrorism and/or
security studies (also cf. Milton-Edwards 2002).
In a highly charged political field, in which normative orientations often
take the place of reasoned analysis, this surely has implications for perceptions
and findings. The literature on Islamism in Palestine is revealing of the priorities
of academics in the field: references to Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami’ are scarce,
whereas there is a vast number of references to Hamas.  It seems plausible that
this reflects the biases of a field in which the organisation that is perceived as
having the greatest potential for violence is accorded most scholarly attention.
This reinforces preconceived notions of what Islamism is all about. Secondly,
the studies referenced in this bibliography are almost exclusively based on
textual and/or oral sources, rather than participant observation. Discourse is
given priority over practice. Norton (1995) criticises the tendency to focus on
the statements of the ideologues and spokesmen of Islamist movements, rather
than their supporters. The studies included in this bibliography in general
constitute no exception in this regard.
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2. Annotated bibliography
Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). “HAMAS: a Historical and Political Background.”
Journal of Palestine Studies 22(4): 5-19.
The author argues that the Islamic movement in the Occupied Territories
only evolved as a popular force of significance during the first Intifada. Prior to
this, it had been discredited through evading armed confrontation with the
Israeli occupation forces. Abu-Amr claims that the basis of the growth of the
Muslim Brotherhood was disillusionment with the nationalists in the
Palestinian population. He points to a deterioration in Hamas' relations with
Saudi Arabia and other sources of funding in the Gulf states after the Gulf War
in 1991, and refers to claims that Iran has provided military training for Hamas
activists in Iran and Lebanon, as well as direct financial support to Hamas.
Abu-Amr suggests that Hamas will gain from PLO failures in the future.
Keywords: Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, PLO
Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism and Democracy.
Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. E. Kaufman, S. B. Abed
and R. L. Rothstein (eds). Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
In this essay, the views of Palestinian Islamists on pluralism and
democracy are presented. The author introduces a distinction between Islamist
movements in Arab countries and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. For
the latter, the struggle for national liberation provides the immediate context
for their deliberations on the issue of Islamic rule. Consequently, Abu-Amr
claims that Palestinian Islamists have "no authentic positions or articulations of
their own" on the issues of pluralism and democracy. Their bottom line is that
democracy is a Western concept. But political pluralism will on the other hand
be accepted by Palestinian Islamists in the absence of an Islamic state, since it
serves their interests. Local elections are under the prevailing circumstances also
acceptable, since it will reveal the strength of the Islamists vis-à-vis the PLO,
according to the former. Under Islamic rule, however, no political parties with
non-Islamic ideologies will be tolerated. Abu-Amr sees the discourse on
democracy and multiparty elections among Palestinian Islamists as mere tactical
manoeuvring.
Keywords: Islamists, pluralism, Hamas, Islamic Jihad
Abu-Amr, Z. (1994). Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza:
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University
Press.
The author distinguishes between an Islamic and a nationalist trend in
Palestinian society. These trends are mutually opposed both politically and
ideologically. He emphasises as a important factor the fact that the Muslim
Brotherhood was not subjected to the same treatment as PLO-Fatah prior to the
outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, since the movement at this point did not
advocate violent resistance. The Israeli authorities assumed that the growth of
Islamic groups and a spread of their influence would weaken the PLO in the
West Bank and Gaza. The first Intifada erupted without a conscious decision
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from any organised group. Abu-Amr claims that the supporters of Islamic Jihad
come mainly from refugee camps and poor neighbourhoods in Gaza. He
regards Islamic Jihad as more militant, and more reluctant to compromise with
Israel than the Muslim Brotherhood.
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PLO
Abu-Amr, Z. (1997). Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and the Origins of Hamas.
Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East. R. S.
Appleby (ed). Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press: 225-256.
This essay, a contribution to a collection of essays on Islamist leaders in
the Middle East, profiles Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the ideological leader of Hamas.
Yasin comes from what was a relatively wealthy family in pre-1948 Palestine.
As a refugee in Gaza after the war of 1948, Yasin grew up in poverty. In post-
war Gaza, only the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists were politically
active. Quadriplegic after an accident at the age of 16, and unable to afford
higher education, Yasin became a committed member of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Abu-Amr suggests that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank
and Gaza after the 1967 war, and the weakening of secular Arab nationalism
that this defeat implied, provided a context for the rise of the Palestinian
Islamic Movement. As a preacher in Gaza, Yasin turned the mosque into a
centre of learning and a place for political organisation, according to Abu-
Amr. Further influence for Yasin was provided through the Muslim
Brotherhood's control of the waqf organisation in Gaza. The waqf organisation
controls 10 percent of all real estate in Gaza. Yasin's influence also grew out of
his role as a leader to whom Gazans turned for mediation and arbitration in
civil disputes under the first intifada. Abu-Amr regards Yasin's endorsement of
multiparty systems as a mere tactical move, and concludes that what Yasin has
provided is situational leadership, i.e. a leadership that responds to the
requirements of its own environment.
Keywords: Yasin, Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas
Al- Ayid, K. (1999). “The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An
Interview with Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah.” Journal of Palestine Studies 28(4):
61-73.
In this translated interview, the secretary general of Islamic Jihad,
Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah, who assumed this post after the assassination of
Fathi Shiqaqi by Mossad agents in 1995, presents Islamic Jihad's views on the
conflict with the state of Israel, and describes the origins of the Islamic Jihad
movement. Shallah confirms that armed resistance against Israeli occupation is
first in the order of priorities for Islamic Jihad, and that Islamic Jihad's position
is that peace in the region requires the physical removal of Israel, rather than
negotiations and compromise. Furthermore, the ideological and financial
importance of the Iranian revolution to Islamic Jihad is addressed.
Keywords: Keywords: Shallah, Islamic Jihad, Iranian revolution
Al-Jarbawi, A. (1994). “The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Oslo
Accord.” The Muslim World LXXXIV(1-2): 127-154.
The article presents the position of Hamas and other Palestinian Islamist
movements on the Oslo Accords and the DoP of 1994. It is revealed that there
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have been ambivalent positions on the issue of negotiations with Israel even
within the Islamic Jihad.  With regard to Hamas, the author suggests that the
DoP forced Hamas onto the defensive, and brought about a challenge to the
harmony between the movement's principles and its practical approaches to
politics. With reference to Hamas' stance on the Oslo Accords and the DoP, Al-
Jarbawi argues that it is difficult to alter a political position when this position
is based on religious principles. However, he demonstrates that Hamas has
pursued a policy of open options in response to the Oslo Accords, by both
opposing the accords and entertaining the possibility of working within the
framework of the accords. This points to the existence of elements within
Hamas that differ in terms of perspectives, means, agendas and policies. The
policy of open options would allow Hamas to benefit whatever the outcome of
the peace process.
Keywords: Islamists, the Oslo Accord, Hamas, Islamic Jihad
Andoni, L. (1997). “Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide Bombers.” Journal
of Palestine Studies 26(4): 33-45.
This article narrates the story of two Palestinian militants from Al-Shati'i
refugee camp and the Shaykh Ridwan District in Gaza who were killed in
attacks on Israeli soldiers in Tel Aviv and Netzarim in 1994. The author
emphasises their common itineraries as Fatah-aligned activists during the first
Intifada who gradually became disillusioned with the peace process. Eventually,
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attacks in which they were killed.
The article includes a detailed description of the socio-economic circumstances
of residents in Gaza, and of the harassment inflicted on Gazans by Israeli
forces.
Keywords: Suicide bombers, Islamic Jihad, Gaza
Barghouti, I. (1991). “Religion and Politics among the Students of Najah
National University.” Middle Eastern Studies 27(2): 203-218.
This article draws on survey data from a socio-political study of university
students in the West Bank prior to 1987. Najah National University in Nablus
is the largest Palestinian university, and has both secular and religious faculties.
It was historically a nationalist-dominated university. According to the author,
the aim of the article is to determine the correlation between the degree of
religious observance and socio-political positions among student respondents.
As measured in terms of religious observance, Barghouti finds that male
students are less religious than female students, that students from Gaza are
more religious than students from the West Bank, and that students from
merchant families are less religious than those from worker families.
Furthermore, the author finds that religious observance is still negatively related
to political activism. Based on printed material issued by the various political
factions at the university campus, he suggests that for the Islamists among
Najah's students issues of personal morality appear to be more important than
the Israeli occupation. The author indicates that students are the most active
segment of the Palestinian population in resisting the Israeli occupation since
they are free from the constraints imposed by regular contact with the Israeli
economy.
Keywords: Najah University, Palestinian students, Muslim Brotherhood
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Barghouti, I. (1995). The Islamists in Jordan and the Palestinian Occupied
Territories. The Islamist Dilemma: the Political Role of Islamist Movements. L.
Guazzone (ed). London, Ithaca Press: 129-160.
Provides an outline of the Islamist movement in Palestine and in Jordan by
presenting the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoot Hamas, Hezb al-Tahrir al-
Islami’ Islamic Liberation Party and Islamic Jihad. It is noted that the interest
taken in the Palestinian question by Hamas represents a qualitative shift in the
Muslim Botherhood's position on the Palestinian national problem. The author
claims that the Palestinian Islamist movement is dominated by intellectuals and
has a weak support base among Palestinian workers. He points out that the
movement in general is stronger in areas traditionally considered conservative,
such as Gaza, Hebron and Nablus, but weaker in Bethlehem, Ramallah and
Jerusalem. An explication of the Palestinian Islamists' stance on the Gulf War in
1991 is also offered.
Keywords: Islamists, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami'
Darwish, B. K. (1996). “Arafat and the Islamists: Conflict or Cooperation?”
Current History(January 1996): 28-32.
The author suggests that Hamas has tried to sketch out a position of
compromise with regard to the PNA. She claims that Arafat's authoritarianism
in the post-Oslo era was a result of the conditions under which the PNA was
born, and of the requirements imposed by Israel on the PNA. Kodmani sees full
recognition of the Islamist movement as a responsible opposition movement by
the PNA as the only solution for the latter to avoid full confrontation with
Hamas.
Keywords: PNA, Hamas, Arafat, Fatah
Farouki, S. T. (2000). “Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and
Al-Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews.” Middle Eastern Studies 36(4): 21-46.
This article analyses the political rhetoric and practice of Hezb al-Tahrir
al-Islami' and its London-based offshoot al-Muhajiron with regard to the state
of Israel. The author demonstrates that even if Hezb al-Tahrir was established
in the context of post-1948 Palestine, Palestine has never been the predominant
focus of this elitist group. Hezb al-Tahrir sees the creation of the state of Israel
in 1948 as an attempt by the Christian West to avenge the Muslim reconquest
of Jerusalem in 1187. The politics of the Muslim world is understood in terms
of a perpetual competition for influence between the UK and the USA. The
party condemns the peace process, and claims that Muslims are obliged to
liberate territories that historically have belonged to the domain of Islam. While
the group maintains that holy war, jihad, is an individual obligation on all
Muslims whose land has been occupied, it posits the existence of a caliphal
state as a precondition for launching jihad. Hezb al-Tahrir has therefore never
taken part in armed resistance to Israeli occupation. The author concludes that
it is not always possible to assume militancy on the basis of Islamists' threats of
jihad.
Keywords: Islamism, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', Jihad
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Gaess, R. (1998). “Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab.” Middle East Policy 6(1):
116-120.
In this interview, conducted in November 1997, Ismail Abu Shanab, a
founder member and a leader of Hamas in Gaza, states Hamas' views on the
PA and on Israel. Shanab also served as the first chairman of Khalas, the
Islamic party founded in 1996. He belongs to the moderate faction of Hamas,
and was among those who entertained the idea of Hamas taking part in the
Palestinian elections of 1996. He emphasises that there is a division of roles
rather than a division of thought between Khalas and Hamas. Khalas' aim,
according to Shanab, is to present an Islamic viewpoint on internal political
issues under PA rule, rather than to resist the Israeli occupation, as Hamas
does. In this interview, he repeats the demand for an Israeli withdrawal from
territories occupied since 1967 as a precondition for a ceasefire. Shanab claims
that Hamas is not out to destroy Israel, and refers to peace in separate states, i.
e a two-state solution. Shanab threatens "another explosion directed at our
enemies" if Israeli pressure on the Palestinians continues.
Keywords: Khalas, Hamas, PA
Hajjar, L. (1993). “The Islamist Movements in the Occupied Territories:
An Interview with Iyad Barghouti.” Middle East Report(183): 9-12.
In this interview Iyad Bargouthi, a professor in sociology at the al-Najah
University in Nablus, explains his understanding of the phenomenon of the
Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. He notes that
Hamas has a lot of popularity among young Palestinians, but states that he
does not think that this has much to do with religion. Much of the support for
Islamist groups, he contends, is in effect a critique of other Palestinian groups
rather than support for Islamist politics. Barghouti claims that there is no real
debate among people who identify with Hamas about women's rights and roles,
democratisation and the role of Islam in national politics. These issues are
sidelined by the struggle against Israel and competition with the PLO.
He regards the funding available to religious institutions as an important source
of popularity for the Islamist movements.
Keywords: Islamism, Hamas
Hammami, R. (1997). From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the
Women's Movement, and National Identity in the Intifada. Political Islam:
Essays from the Middle East Report. J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds). London &
New York, I.B Tauris: 194-210.
The author uses an incident from the first intifada in 1987 as the starting
point for an analysis of the changing views on the roles of Palestinian women
that evolved in the course of the intifada.
In 1989, young boys in Gaza started to vent their anger against local women
who were not wearing headscarves. In the months that followed, many
Palestinian women donned headscarves for fear of such boys. In this manner,
an issue previously consigned to the religious arena had turned into a
nationalist one. Hammami takes issue with analysts such as Edward Said, who
were inclined to see the first Intifada as enabling a social and political liberation
of Palestinian women.  Whereas the Islamist movement had tried to impose the
wearing of headscarves on educated, urban, and petit bourgeois women (who in
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general were less likely to wear them) in the 1970s, by 1989 the wearing of
headscarves had turned into a signifier of women's commitment to the
liberation of Palestine. The author implies that the  PA on the ground continues
to compete with Hamas by invoking a discourse of social morality that
constrains the freedom of Palestinian women.
Keywords: Islamists, Palestinian women, Intifada
Hassan, N. (2001). “An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the "Human Bombs".”
The New Yorker 77(36): 36-41.
Based on 250 interviews with militants in the Islamist movements in
Palestine between 1996 and 1999, their families and instructors, the author
provides an exploration into the background of suicide bombers or 'martyrs',
and details the phases of suicide missions. She notes that the suicide bombers,
who in age ranged from 18 to 38 years, did not conform to the profile of
suicidal persons. None appeared to be desperately poor, uneducated or
depressed. Over 50 per cent were refugees from present Israel. In their
communities, they were regarded as model youths, and most were bearded and
deeply religious. Hassan claims that martyrdom in the form of suicide missions
was first advocated by Islamic Jihad's Fathi Shiqaqi in 1988. By the early
1990s, Hamas' 'engineer' Yahyya Ayyash (assassinated by the Israelis in 1996)
had recommended its use by Hamas too. For both, such operations were
designed to inflict damage on Israeli society on a much larger scale than had
been possible in the course of the first Intifada. According to Hassan, the costs
of a suicide operation are extremely low, on average about $150. Militants in
both Hamas and Islamic Jihad claim that the number of volunteers for suicide
operations by far exceeds the number of people who eventually become suicide
bombers. In the selection of suicide bombers volunteers that are under 18 (the
age requirement has since been lowered), are sole providers or are married are
generally turned down. The ability to pass as an Israeli is also taken into
account when selecting candidates for suicide operations.
Keywords: Suicide bombers, Islamic Jihad, Hamas
Hatina, M. (1997). “Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Movement.” Orient 38(1):
107-120.
The article explores the Iranian support of Palestinian Islamic movements,
such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas. At the outset, it is pointed out that the
historical split between Sunnis and Shiites curtailed the export of the Iranian
Islamic revolution. In the case of the Islamic Jihad organisations, the author
finds that these organisations expressed ideological and political loyalty to the
Iranian revolution. Islamic Jihad downplayed the significance of inter-
denominational differences between Shiites and Sunnis. Islamic Jihad has leaned
heavily on material support from and operational co-ordination with
Hizbu'llah, the pro-Iranian Shiite group in Lebanon.
Hamas, on the other hand, has proceeded cautiously in its relations with Iran so
as not to compromise its support among the Sunni Palestinians or its financial
support from Sunni Arab Islamist movements. Central leaders in Hamas have
advocated that fostering good relations with the latter has priority in
comparison with relations with Iran.
Keywords: Iran, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizbu'llah
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Hatina, M. (1999). “Hamas and the Oslo Accords: Religious Dogma in a
Changing Political Reality.” Mediterranean Politics 4(3): 37-55.
In this article, the author claims that Hamas has managed to adapt to the
new realities in the Occupied Territories created by the Oslo Accords without
significantly moderating its ideological outlook. According to Hatina, Hamas
was created in an attempt to bridge the gaps within the Muslim Brotherhood
between the older generation of leaders and a much more confrontational and
better educated younger generation, and in order to compete with the PLO for
the leadership of Palestinians. In the post-Oslo phase, the external leadership of
Hamas, which in general held a more extreme line on relations with the PA and
on the armed struggle with Israel, gained power at the expense of the internal
leadership. However, the author opines that the frictions within Hamas post-
Oslo pertained more to a choice of tactical means than to an actual change in
the vision of an Islamic Palestinian state. Hence, the accommodation with the
PA did not reflect ideological motivation, but rather political realism. The
author concludes that the weight of Hamas within Palestinian society will
depend on the degree of success of Palestinian nationalism on issues such as
social welfare and Palestinian independence.
Keywords: The Oslo Accords, Hamas, PA
Hatina, M. (2001). Islam and Salvation in Palestine: the Islamic Jihad
Movement. Tel Aviv, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African
Studies, Tel Aviv University.
In the most comprehensive survey of the Islamic Jihad movement to date,
the author analyses the background to Islamic Jihad, its discourse, and
significant events in its military confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces.
The Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Occupied Territories is a conglomerate of
factions sharing a common ideological ground, namely the emphasis on the
liberation of Palestine through armed jihad. According to Hatina, the most
important faction, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, led by Fathi
Shiqaqi and Abdul Aziz Awda, emerged in Gaza in the early 1980s. It grew out
of the discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood's reluctance at that time to
engage in military resistance against the Israeli occupation. The political
discourse of Islamic Jihad blends nationalism and Islamism. The liberation of
Palestine is however prior to an Islamisation of Palestinian society in the order
of priorities of Islamic Jihad. Ideologically, Islamic Jihad draws on the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood (Sayyid Qutb), Islamic militant groups in Egypt
(Mohammed Al-Faraj) and the Islamic revolution in Iran. During the first
Intifada, Fatah supported Islamic Jihad groups in an unofficial operational
alliance, in order to undermine popular support for Hamas. When Shiqaqi and
Awda were expelled to Lebanon by Israel in 1988, the influence of Iran and
Hizbu'llah on Islamic Jihad increased. As was the case in Hamas, the internal
leadership of Islamic Jihad advocated accommodation with the Palestinian
Authority, but the external leadership in Lebanon and Syria opposed this.
Islamic Jihad has been consistently opposed to the Oslo Accords, and the
author emphasises that in contradistinction to Hamas and PLO-Fatah, the
centre of gravity in Islamic Jihad lies outside the Palestinian Occupied
Territories. Hatina appears to regard Islamic Jihad as a typical Islamist
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phenomenon, in the sense that it is largely composed of educated and urban
young people with a sense of alienation.
Keywords: Islamic Jihad, Hamas, PA, Iran, Hizbu'llah
Hijazi, H. (1995). “Hamas: waiting for Nationalism to Self-Destruct: An
Interview with Mahmud Zahar.” Journal of Palestine Studies 24(3): 81-88.
In this interview, Mahmud Zahhar, Hamas' spokesman in Gaza, outlines
Hamas' views on the Palestinian elections in 1995, on secular nationalism in the
Arab world, as well as on relations with the PA.
He justifies Hamas' decision not to take part in the elections to the PLC and to
the office of president by pointing to overall Israeli control over the peace
process, which the movement finds unacceptable. Zahhar emphasises that civil
war in Palestinian society constitutes a red line which Hamas will not cross at
any price, and argues that with time, the "contradictions" of the PA will be
revealed. Due to these inherent contradictions, Zahhar argues that Hamas need
not be confrontational towards the PA. He predicts that the internal conflict
between segments in Fatah and the PA will erupt sooner or later.
Keywords: Zahhar, Hamas, Khalas, elections, PA
Hroub, K. (2000). Hamas: political thought and practice. Washington, D.C,
Institute for Palestine Studies.
In this book, based on interviews with prominent Hamas leaders and on
analyses of Hamas' official statements, the author presents Hamas as "a
response to the cruel circumstances of life under occupation". Hroub purports
to present Hamas as Palestinians view it, that is, as a "multi-dimensional"
political movement. Hroub suggests that Hamas' grass-roots support goes
beyond the deeply religious, and that Hamas' share of public support is
contingent on how well it embodies the state of resistance. The emergence of
Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the 1980s is seen as
crucial to the shift towards armed struggle in the Muslim Brotherhood. Hroub
criticises authors who suggest that Hamas were latecomers to the first intifada
in 1987, and claims that Hamas was established a few days into the uprising.
He claims that Hamas' conflict with the state of Israel is based on acts of
aggression by the latter, and not on differences in religious ideology between
these parties. Hamas' vacillation on the Oslo Accords often masked simple
confusion. Hroub concludes that if a settlement with Israel acceptable to most
Palestinians were reached, Hamas' vision of an Islamic Palestinian State would
be defeated.
Keywords: Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, PA, Oslo Accords
Human Rights Watch (2002). Erased in a Moment: Suicide bombing attacks on
Israeli civilians. New York, Washington, London & Brussels, Human Rights
Watch: 172.
This Human Rights Watch report covers suicide bombings against Israeli
civilians in the period between 20 September 2000 and 31 August 2002. It
includes sections on the background to and involvement of Islamist groups such
as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. The
report reveals that in terms of inflicting Israeli civilian casualties, Hamas has
been the most destructive of the militant Palestinian groups. In the period under
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review, 168 Israelis, including 153 civilians, were killed in suicide bombing
attacks for which Hamas claimed responsibility. This constitutes 64 % of all
Israelis killed in suicide bombing attacks in the period. Hamas has claimed
responsibility for 37 % of all suicide bombing attacks in the period. The report
also reveals that a relatively higher number of victims are Israeli military
personnel in the case of suicide bombing attacks claimed by Islamic Jihad. The
report concludes that the repeated attacks on Israeli civilians by groups such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada meet the
definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to the report,
the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad appear to be criminal offenders under
international humanitarian law for having encouraged and endorsed suicide
attacks against Israeli civilians.
Keywords: Suicide bombing attacks, international humanitarian laws, Hamas,
Islamic Jihad
Inbar, E. (1997). Islamic Extremism and the Peace Process. Religious
Radicalism in the Greater Middle East. E. Inbar and B. Maddy-Weitzman (eds).
London, Frank Cass: 199-215.
This is an analysis of the capabilities of Islamists (or "Islamic extremists")
in the Middle East to derail the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians
after Oslo. Inbar claims that the ultimate goal of Palestinian Islamists
concerning Israel is politicide, i.e. the obliteration of a political entity.
Palestinian Islamists are therefore adamantly opposed to the peace process, and
represent a significant threat since they appear to have a low sensitivity to cost.
In the view of this author, Palestinian terrorism ought not to be considered a
major problem for Israel, as it does not threaten the state's basic existence. In
his perception, Islamism will not disappear as a result of economic and social
engineering by the largely secular elites of Middle Eastern countries.
Keywords: Islamists, peace process
Jensen, M. I. (1998). Islamism and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip. Islamic
Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities. A. Mousalli (ed). Reading, Ithaca Press:
197-220.
In this essay, the author takes his lead from A.R. Norton's observation
that scholarship on the phenomenon on Islamism has been overly textual, to the
detriment of sociological analyses. Jensen provides an overview of the history of
the Islamic social institutions in the Gaza Strip, as well as a sociological profile
of the male members of an Islamic sports club in Gaza. He notes that
"moderate Islamists" (i.e. Hamas) believe that the reform of the individual is a
prerequisite for the transformation of society, and argues that Hamas has never
abandoned this conviction, even whilst giving priority to the armed resistance
against Israeli occupation. According to the author, Islamic NGOs in the Gaza
Strip operate in the fields of education and social and health care. In explaining
the increased levels of support for the Islamist movements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Jensen points to the failure of Palestinian nationalism to
fulfil the aspirations of Palestinians, indirect Israeli assistance in order to
weaken the PLO, the massive support for Islamists from the Gulf states after
1973, and the role of Hezbu'llah in Lebanon in providing an example of an
Islamist movement that was able to end Israeli occupation. He indicates that
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sports are seen as an important element in attracting Palestinians towards
Islamic institutions by Hamas' leaders. The male members of an Islamic sports
club in Gaza interviewed by the author emphasise that they have different and
higher moral aims than the members of Fatah-dominated clubs in the area.
However, none of them appear to dress like Islamists either on or off the sports
pitch. Non-religious circumstances are significant in the choice of sports club.
Jensen finds that no schooling or indoctrination took place in the club, and
asserts that young Islamists in Gaza therefore do not fit the stereotype of
dangerous terrorists.
Keywords: Hamas, civil society, sports
Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of
Religious Violence. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, University of California
Press.
Chapter 4 of this book contains excerpts of interviews with Abdel Aziz
Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader in Gaza, and sheikh Ahmed Yasin. Both
Rantisi and Yasin indicate that they conceptualise the conflict with Israel as a
war on religious terms. They emphasise that Palestinians have been the victims,
rather than the aggressors, in this conflict. They defend suicide operations as
means through which ordinary Israelis may be made aware of the suffering of
the Palestinians. Rantisi points to the Israeli attacks on demonstrating
Palestinians outside the Al-Aqsa mosque in 1990 and to the Hebron massacre
in 1994 as motivations behind the shift towards 'martyrdom operations' or
suicide bombings in Hamas.
Keywords: Hamas, suicide bombings, Yasin
Karmon, E. (2000). “Hamas' Terrorism Strategy: operational Limitations and
Political Constraints.” Meria 4(1): 1-13.
In this article it is argued that the decline in terrorist activities against
Israel by Palestinian Islamists in the period 1996 to 1999 was due to the
counter-terrorist strategy of the PA and Israel and to Jordanian moves against
the external leadership of Hamas in 1999. The author suggests that the
declarations of Hamas' political leaders in the course of 1999 evidence an
interest in perpetrating terrorist attacks from the side of Hamas.
Keywords: Hamas, PA, terrorism
Kepel, G. (2002). Jihad: The trail of Political Islam. London & New York, I.B
Tauris Publishers.
Two of the chapters in this extensive survey of political Islam in the
Middle East deal with Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories. The author claims that Hamas was created within a few days of the
outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. He regards Hamas as an attempt by the
dominant devout middle-class in the Muslim Brotherhood to avoid losing the
Palestinian underclass youth, the shebab, to rival movements such as Fatah or
Islamic Jihad. Kepel suggests that the military wing of Hamas, which he
describes as largely independent, recruits its members from the urban poor.
According to Kepel, this class is largely supportive of violent tactics and a no-
compromise stance towards Israel, whereas the historically dominant devout
middle-class in Hamas was eager to take part in the establishment of a new
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political power centre under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. In
line with the central argument of his book, Kepel asserts that radicals with poor
backgrounds were dissociated from the moderate middle-class in the post-Oslo
phase. However, the Al-Aqsa intifada, and the resulting Israeli repression, again
tipped the balance in favour of Hamas and its radicals.
Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Intifada
Klein, M. (1996). “Competing Brothers: the Web of HAMAS-PLO Relations.”
Terrorism and Political Violence 8(2): 111-132.
In exploring the relations between Hamas and the PLO in the period
between 1988 and 1995, the author finds that the Oslo Accords, and in
particular the DoP, significantly altered the nature of Hamas-PLO relations. In
this process Hamas was forced to confront the discrepancies between the
movement's ideology and its praxis. As a result of the political advances of the
PLO, Hamas' tactical pragmatism increased. Hamas was opposed to any peace
accords with Israel, since this would necessitate recognition of the legitimacy of
the state of Israel, which at the outset had been deemed as kufr or heresy in
Hamas ideology. In spite of this, pragmatists within the movement argued in
favour of partial integration into the structures of the Palestinian Authority.
However, the pragmatic line met with opposition from the external leadership
of Hamas, which preferred the military option. Hamas established
communication channels with the PLO in order to prevent the outbreak of a
Palestinian civil war. The author concludes, however, that the tacit
understanding between Hamas and the PLO was close to breaking point by
1996.
Keywords: Hamas, PLO, PA
Klein, M. (1997). “Quo Vadis? Palestinian Authority Building Dilemmas Since
1993.” Middle Eastern Studies 33(2): 384-404.
Although primarily dealing with divisions and conflicts of interest within
the PLO, this article also addresses the relationship between the PA, established
in 1994 as a result of the DoP) and Hamas. As president of the PA, Yasir Arafat
encouraged the pragmatists in Hamas to participate in elections to PLC, and by
refusing to take steps against Izz ed-Din al-Qassem units that had perpetrated
acts of violence from PA-controlled territory. Hamas' partners in the
Damascus-based Palestinian Forces Alliance reacted negatively to the
rapprochement that developed between Hamas and the PA. The author
concludes that the power of the PLO leadership may not be sufficient if the PA
fails to improve the quality of life for the Palestinians.
Keywords: Hamas, PA
Kristiansen, W. (1999). “Challenge and Counterchallenges: Hamas' Response
to Oslo.” Journal of Palestine Studies 28(3): 19-36.
The author offers an overview of Hamas' challenges to the Palestinian
Authority and to Israel in the post-Oslo era. Her contention is that Hamas'
opposition to the Oslo Accords has been the basis of the support it has built up.
Kristianasen notes the emergence of a more moderate generation of Hamas
leaders in Gaza in the mid-1990s. In Gaza, Hamas was faced with a strong PA
presence and had to opt for pragmatism in order to secure its hold over
C M I
18
mosques and social institutions. The Hamas leaders outside the Occupied
Territories (in Damascus and Amman) were in general less inclined to
compromise with the PA. The author sees the Wye Accords of 1998 as an
attempt by the USA and Israel to eliminate Hamas. Hamas will however remain
an important player on the Palestinian arena because of the small returns that
the Oslo Accords have yielded for the Palestinians.
Keywords: Hamas, Oslo Accords, Wye Accords
Legrain, J.-F. (1990). The Islamic Movement and the Intifada. Intifada:
Palestine at the Crossroads. J. R. Nassar and R. Heacock (eds). New York &
Westport, Connecticut, Praeger: 176-189.
Observing that Islamism has a common matrix but is articulated in ways
which vary between different local contexts, the author details Islamic Jihad
and Hamas' involvement in the first Intifada 1987-1993. Legrain notes that
there appears to be a general consensus to the effect that a military wing of
Islamic Jihad, the Jihad Brigades, played an essential role in the process that led
to the outbreak of the uprising. On the basis of selected publications by
Palestinian Islamists, he contends that persons close to Islamic Jihad may have
been among the founders of Hamas in 1988. Furthermore, he points out that
the progressive co-ordination that took place between Hamas and the UNLU,
the PLO-aligned leadership of the Intifada, masked crucial political differences.
He predicts that the only guarantee for victory for the PLO over the Palestinian
Islamists lies in the attainment of political results through diplomatic initiatives.
Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Intifada
Legrain, J.-F. (1991). A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism.
Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis. J. Piscatori (ed). Chicago, Illinois,
American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 70-87.
This article analyses the communiqués issued by Hamas on the Gulf War
in 1991, and suggests motives behind Hamas' positioning at the time. Contrary
to the PLO/Fatah, which wholeheartedly embraced the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, and thereby compromised their support from the Gulf states, Hamas
opted for a compromise of sorts. It condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
but also the presence of Western military forces in the Gulf. Hamas
communiqués in the period under review were however primarily focused on
the resistance to Israeli occupation. Hamas was unwilling to risk sanctions from
its Gulf donors, but also had an eye to the post-war situation. The author
concludes that by its response to the Gulf War Hamas proved to be more adept
than the PLO at reading the signs of the times.
Keywords: The Gulf War, Hamas, PLO, Iraq, Kuwait
Legrain, J.-F. (1994). Palestinian Islamisms: Patriotism as a Condition of Their
Expansion. Accounting for Fundamentalisms: the Dynamic Character of
Movements. M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds). Chicago & London, The
University of Chicago Press. IV: 413-427.
In this analysis of the development of Palestinian Islamisms, the author
applies two concepts borrowed from the work of Kepel (1990), namely
“Islamisation from below” and “Islamisation from above”. The former focuses
on the Islamisation of society through establishing and organising Islamised
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spaces in society, whereas the latter tends to prioritise the violent overthrow of
the 'un-Islamic' state. Legrain regards the Islamic Jihad movements as
representatives of “Islamisation from above”, and the Muslim Brotherhood as a
representative of “Islamisation from below”. He takes issue with the notion
that Palestinian Islamists represent the most disadvantaged strata of Palestinian
society. Legrain claims that it was the activities of Islamic Jihad in Gaza in 1987
which stimulated the outbreak of the first Intifada. Hence, Israeli military
reprisals struck Islamic Jihad harder than Hamas, since Hamas did not opt for
military confrontation with Israeli forces before February 1988. This essay
suggests that Hamas came out of the Gulf War in 1991 in a stronger position
than the PLO, due to the fact that Hamas had maintained a relative silence on
the War, for fear of financial repercussions. Legrain concludes that the
particulars of the Palestinian situation reverse the chronological sequence of
Kepel's “Islamisation from below”. Kepel assumes that “Islamisation from
below” follows a "failed" “Islamisation from above”, as was the case in Iran,
but Legrain demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood took up arms against
Israel through Hamas precisely in order to be able to pursue an “Islamisation
from below”.
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Islamisation
Legrain, J.-F. (1997). HAMAS: Legitimate heir of Palestinian nationalism?
Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? J. L. Esposito (ed). Boulder,
Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997: 159-178.
The author asserts that Palestinian nationalism in the form of the PLO
had an exceptional durability in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in
comparison to other areas in the Middle East due to the exceptional
circumstances of being under Israeli occupation. The success of Hamas reveals
that the Islamist movement can no longer be seen as an epi-phenomenon.
According to Legrain, the sine qua non of Hamas' success in assuming the
heritage of the PLO has been its merger of political and military policies, of
Islamism and nationalism. He launches a two-stage theory of the establishment
of Hamas. In mid-December 1987 prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders in
Gaza decided on their own initiative to establish Hamas. Hamas was then
recognised as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in February 1988, at a
meeting in Amman. The increase in Hamas' power since the signing of the Oslo
Accords, Legrain suggests, should be seen in the context of Israeli refusals to
honour the agreements, through deferrals of deadlines, continued targeted
assassinations, dramatic increases in the number of settlers and so forth. The
main challenge of Hamas has been to manage its internal diversity, centred on
the conflicting priorities of the old guard of Muslim Brotherhood leaders,
whose first priority has always been the Islamisation of Palestinian society, and
the young guard, for whom the immediate liberation of Palestine and
administrative power are more important considerations. Legrain predicts that
popular perceptions of PNA illegitimacy are bound to intensify since no Israeli
concession on the question of Palestine can be expected anytime soon.
Keywords: Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, PNA
Litvak, M. (1993). “Palestinian Leadership in the Territories During the
Intifada,1987-1992.” Orient 34(2): 199-220.
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This article provides a sociological profile of the nationalist (UNLU) and
Islamist (Hamas) leaderships during the first Intifada. The author regards
Hamas as the most significant manifestation of a shift towards the dominance
of an internal leadership of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation.
Unlike the PLO-affiliated organisations, Hamas' leadership and power base was
at the time in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Hamas stressed that the duty
of the Palestinian diaspora was to support but not to command their brethren
in the Occupied Territories. Of the ten founding members of Hamas recorded
by Litvak, three were clergymen and three were high school teachers. The
Islamic University of Gaza employed four out of ten founding members. The
author also finds that an important characteristic of senior Hamas leaders,
particularly in Gaza, is that they have refugee backgrounds. This marked a
contrast with the pro-PLO leadership of UNLU, which to a larger extent than
Hamas represented the traditional elites of Palestinian society. Litvak predicts
that a success in the peace process will marginalise Hamas, whereas failure
might imply that Hamas becomes the leading force in Palestinian politics.
Keywords: Hamas, UNLU, Intifada
Litvak, M. (1998). “The Islamisation of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the
Case of Hamas.” Middle Eastern Studies 34(1): 148-163.
This article is a textual analysis of Hamas ideology, as expressed in the
Hamas Charter of 1988, various handbills issued by Hamas, and in the official
organ of Hamas, Filastin al-Muslimin. The author regards Hamas as the
expression of an Islamisation of the conflict, inasmuch as Hamas ideology
portrays the conflict as a battle between two rival religions. Furthermore, he
claims that Hamas ideology (in contradistinction to Palestinian secular
nationalist ideology) draws no distinction between Jews and Zionists. Central
to Hamas ideology is the belief that Palestine is waqf, which implies that it
belongs to the entire Muslim nation, umma, eternally. Litvak demonstrates that
this view has no legal basis in shari'a or Islamic Law, and hence, that it must be
considered an "invention of tradition". Hamas ideology regards the state of
Israel as an instrument in the Western onslaught on Islamic civilisation.
Negotiations and peaceful solutions are discarded, since they imply concessions
on waqf. However, Litvak points out that the Oslo Accords forced Hamas to
reconcile the discrepancies between ideology and reality. To this end, sheikh
Ahmad Yasin, the ideological leader of Hamas, introduced the distinction
between a full-fledged peace, sulh, and a temporary armistice, hudna. The latter
came to be regarded as permissible as a temporary measure in order for the
Muslims of Palestine to recover their strength, but only for a stipulated period
of ten years, and on condition that Israel withdraw back to the pre-1967
borders.
Keywords: Hamas, ideology, Oslo Accords
Meijer, R. (1997). From al-da'wa to al-hizbiyya: Mainstream Islamic
Movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in the 1990s. Amsterdam, Research
Center for International Political Economy and Foreign Policy Analysis
(RECIPE), University of Amsterdam: 31.
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In a comparative survey of mainstream Islamic movements in Egypt,
Jordan and Palestine, the author applies a distinction between the concepts of
al-da'wa and al-hizbiyya. Hizbiyya refers to the acceptance of multiparty
systems and elections as a tactic, whereas da'wa refers to proselytising and
grassroots mobilisation outside the framework of a party-political system,
which historically has been the main strategy of Islamic movements in order to
assume state power. Meijer notes that there was a general shift among Islamists
in the region towards hizbiyya in the 1990s. In the case of Hamas, however, he
finds that the choice was not one of hizbiyya or da'wa, but rather between
hizbiyya and jihad. The negotiations between the PNA and Hamas in Cairo in
December 1995 strengthened the hardliners within Hamas, and led to a renewal
of the commitment to armed resistance against the Israeli occupation. The
author concludes that Hamas thereby refused to accept hizbiyya as a viable
strategy for gaining power, and resisted incorporation into a political process.
Keywords: Hamas, da'wa, hizbiyya, jihad
Milton-Edwards, B. (1992). “The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic
Movement: a Comparison of Ideas and Techniques.” British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies 19(1): 48-53.
This article explores the application of the religious concept of jihad by
Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Jihad is literally taken to mean a defensive act against
aggressive oppressors occupying Muslim territory. The author points to the
centrality of the liberation of Jerusalem in Hamas' ideology, but emphasises
that the positing of the liberation of Palestine as an end product of jihad
distinguishes Hamas from its Islamist counterparts outside the Occupied
Palestinian Territories. She indicates that the concept of jihad was not current
in the thinking of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood up until the first Intifada
in 1987. Much more central to the ideology promoted by, for instance, sheikh
Yasin was education, tarbiya, and da'wa, preaching. To the Islamic Jihad
movement, however, the concept of jihad had always been a central tenet of its
ideology. The author concludes that the future of the two groups is inextricably
linked to the concept of jihad.
Keywords: Jihad, Hamas, Islamic Jihad
Milton-Edwards, B. (1996). Islamic Politics in Palestine. London & New York,
Tauris Academic Studies.
The author sets out to debunk the 'myth' that the Islamic movement in
Palestine is essentially fundamentalist and 'terrorist' and that politically active
Muslims in the Occupied Palestinian Territories belong to one monolithic
group. Milton-Edwards analyses the background to the Muslim Brotherhood in
Palestine, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami'.
The organisational strength of the Muslim Brotherhood revolved around its
extension of social and educational services, particularly in Gaza, in the 1970s.
The assumption of control over the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) is singled
out as a particularly significant event in the development of the Islamist
movement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Islamic Jihad in Gaza
emerged as a result of a dispute relating to the Muslim Brotherhood's stance
towards the Israeli occupation and the Iranian revolution at IUG. The author
asserts that the building of mosques under the auspices of the Mujamma'
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(sheikh Yasin's centre in Gaza) was supported financially by Israel. The
Mujamma' was however caught out by the strength of feeling in the first few
weeks of the first intifada, and in response formed Hamas as a wing of the
Muslim Brotherhood in February 1988. Milton-Edwards regards Hamas as the
most important player in the political Islam movement at the moment. Hamas
'Palestinianises' Islamic issues, but the author notes that the argument that the
liberation of Palestine is the first step towards the establishment of an abode of
Islam (dar al-Islam) irrespective of borders is notably absent from Hamas'
ideological literature. She suggests that Hamas' ideology should be seen as a
synthesis with nationalism. The author concludes that it is unlikely that
political Islam in the Occupied Palestinian Territories can be eradicated through
military means.
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-
Islami', political Islam
Milton-Edwards, B. (1996). “Political Islam in Palestine in an Environment of
Peace?” Third World Quarterly 17(2): 199-225.
In an attempt to answer the question as to whether the post-Oslo
environment in the Palestinian Occupied Territories has exacerbated "the
religious nature of the conflict" between Israelis and Palestinians, the author
analyses the positions of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami’ on
the Oslo peace process. She points out that the PLO and Israel excluded
Palestinian Islamists from a process that was undemocratic and non-
consultative. The Declaration of Principles, DoP, offered few attractions for the
Islamists. In a Palestinian society in which Muslim identity is often fused with
the nationalist struggle, the tensions that followed in the wake of the Ibrahimi
Mosque massacre in Hebron in 1994 served to alter the attitude of Palestinians
towards the peace process. It highlighted the religious tensions at the heart of
the conflict for the Islamic movement.
Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', Oslo peace process
Milton-Edwards, B. (2002). Researching the Radical: The quest for a new
perspective. Interpreting Islam. H. Donnan (ed). London, Thousand Oaks &
New Dehli, Sage Publications, 2002: 32-50.
In this largely theoretical essay on the biases inherent in much research on
radical Islam, the author details her experiences as a female researcher of
Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
By focusing on a specific interview with leaders of Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' in
Hebron, Milton-Edwards demonstrates how the notion that researching radical
Islam is a male prerogative is reinforced by the cultural and religious attitudes
prevalent among the Islamists, but also within the discipline itself by
predominantly male researchers. The leaders of Hezb and Hamas that she
interviewed repeatedly patronised her by referring to her as ya bint (the girl),
and by directing their responses to her queries to male co-researchers whenever
such a person was present at the interviews.
She suggests that the gendering of research on radical Islam contributes to
Orientalist essentialisations of the Islamist movements.
Keywords: Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', Hamas, gender
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Mishal, S. and R. Aharoni (1994). Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the
Intifada Underground. Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press.
This book contains translations of leaflets issued by the Islamic Resistance
Movement/Hamas in the course of the first Intifada, an editorial introduction
and a statistical breakdown of issues raised in leaflets issued by the UNLU (the
nationalist camp) and Hamas. The authors suggest that Hamas was more
influential than the UNLU in Gaza, whereas the reverse held in the West Bank.
Keywords: Hamas, Covenant
Mishal, S. and A. Sela (2000). The Palestinian HAMAS: Vision, Violence and
Coexistence. New York, Chichester, Columbia University Press.
The authors of this book take issue with the prevailing image of Hamas as
an ideologically intransigent and politically rigid movement, ready to pursue its
goals at any cost. The book seeks to portray Hamas from a discursive and
practical perspective. Mishal and Sela contend that Hamas' record
demonstrates that it is essentially a social movement. It is a socially composite
movement that has been able to transcend class divisions within Palestinian
society. The authors see the disillusionment with modernity and secularism
among urban, educated, lower middle-class Muslims as an explanation for the
growing trend towards Islamisation. However, they also emphasise that
historically the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank represented strata higher
up on the socio-economic scale than in Gaza. In the West Bank, the Muslim
Brotherhood consisted of merchants, landowners and middle-class officials and
professionals. Mishal and Sela regard charitable work for the poor in
Palestinian society as having been a central avenue for the expansion of public
support for the Muslim Brotherhood.  The rising tide of militancy within the
Mujamma' in the 1980s coincided with a shift in the composition of the
backgrounds of university students in the West Bank and Gaza. By the 1980s,
most university students had rural backgrounds. The founders of the
Mujamma', who had initially thought that armed struggle against Israel (the
external jihad) should be postponed until the Islamisation of Palestinian society
had been completed and shari'a imposed, were forced by young militants in
their movement to take up arms against Israel. The surprise outbreak of the
first Intifada in 1987 further strengthened this position, as Mujamma' leaders
feared a loss of support if they did not opt to take part in the uprising.
According to the authors, controlled violence, negotiated coexistence and
calculated participation in the Palestinian Authority have become the main
features of Hamas' political conduct since the Oslo Agreements. Much of the
politics of Hamas can be explained in terms of the tension between Hamas'
dogmatic ideology and its pragmatic approach to political and institutional
survival. The authors conclude that Hamas will continue to mobilise wide
popular support in Palestinian society in the absence of tangible economic
benefits and territorial achievements for the Palestinians in the course of the
peace process. The book includes a translation of the Hamas covenant of 1988.
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, the Mujamma', Hamas, PNA
Mishal, S. and A. Sela (2002). “Participation without Presence: Hamas, the
Palestinian Authority and the Politics of Negotiated Coexistence.” Middle
Eastern Studies 38(3): 1-26.
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The authors analyse the internal debate of Hamas on whether the
movement should be transformed into a political party or not. This debate
evolved as a result of the peace process. An internal discussion paper is
reproduced in extenso. Elections to the PLC and to the Office of President of
the PA were held in 1996. Despite an inclination among Hamas leaders in Gaza
towards taking part in the elections, Hamas officially boycotted them.
However, Hamas encouraged individual Islamists to run as independents, in
order to secure representation of Islamists' views in the PA's executive organs.
Exit polls from these elections suggest that 60 to 70 per cent of Hamas'
supporters participated in the elections. Mishal and Sela align Hamas' stance to
developments within other Islamist movements in the Middle East. Initially,
these adopted violence in response to violent repression from the state. In the
1980s and 1990s, the Islamists in the region increasingly turned toward
political party organisation and to participation in political processes in spite of
the prevailing regimes' non-Islamic character. A confrontational strategy based
on ultimate objectives and ideal aspirations was discarded precisely because this
would endanger the very existence of the movement's social and religious
infrastructure.
Keywords: Hamas, elections, PA
Monshipouri, M. (1996). “The PLO rivalry with Hamas: the Challenge of
Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism.” Middle East Policy 4(3): 84-
105.
In this article, the author argues that in the post-Oslo era the PLO and
Yasir Arafat face the choice of accommodation or confrontation with
Palestinian Islamists. Monshipouri regards a sustainable peace as being
dependent on increased living standards among Palestinians, especially in Gaza,
and on political and financial reform of the PA. Monshipouri suggests that
Hamas may be included in a democratic process, since he sees their political
concerns as much more important than their Islamic positions. He claims that
through their resistance to Israeli occupation Palestinians have demonstrated
that they regard popular consent and elections as the main sources of
legitimacy. Therefore, a rivalry between the PLO and Hamas in the context of a
Palestinian democratisation process may lead to good governance, checks on
the authoritarian tendency of the PLO, and to a consensus about democratic
outcomes.
Keywords: Hamas, PLO, democracy
Nüsse, A. (1998). Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Amsterdam,
Harwood Academic Publishers.
This work focuses exclusively on the ideological side of the phenomenon
of Hamas. The source material, dating from 1990 to 1996, includes the Hamas
covenant, articles in the London-based organ Filastin al-Muslimin and the
Hamas handbills issued in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The author
asserts that Hamas' repetitive use of supposedly fixed concepts in reality
demonstrates ideological flexibility. Non-Islamic concepts are regularly invoked
in Hamas' writings, and Nüsse singles the nationalistic and democratic elements
in Hamas' ideology out as comparatively strong.
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The Hamas covenant quotes the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and the
author suggests that one can find remnants of modern European anti-semitism
in Hamas' image of the Jew as the strong party. She regards the idea that the
Palestinian territory is sacred (an idea regularly invoked by Hamas) as a recent
invention, and asserts that this idea has been adopted from Judaism. Hamas
conceives of Israel as an essentially religious state, and any concessions to this
state as equal to abandoning belief in Islam. The movement depicts the
defensive struggle for the liberation of Palestine as an individual religious duty
upon Muslims, fard 'ayn. Hamas claims to be a movement of all Palestinians,
Muslims and Christians alike, but in an eventual Islamic state, Christians are to
be accorded a status as a religious minority, and tolerated only to the extent
that they accept Muslim superiority. In contradistinction to Legrain, Nüsse
perceives Hamas to have been essentially supportive of Iraq in its confrontation
with the West, even if opposed to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. She
demonstrates that Hamas' criticism of the DoP focused on economic issues, and
not only religious ones, and concludes that the margin between rhetoric and
realpolitik in Hamas leaves a space open for participation in a pluralistic
political system, and possibly abandonment of the armed struggle.
Keywords: Hamas, ideology
Paz, R. (2000). “Higher Education and the Development of Palestinian Islamic
Groups.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4(2): 81-95.
The author links the emergence of Palestinian Islamist groups in the 1980s
to the expansion of educational infrastructure in the Palestinian Occupied
Territories in the 1970s. A rise in the standard of living of Palestinians in this
period led to the formation of a Palestinian middle class. This class used the
higher education system as a means to further their social mobility. The
Palestinian Islamists focused to a great extent on issues of morality at the
universities. This reflected the confrontation between students coming from
villages or refugee camps with strict moral norms, and the secular-nationalist
environment of many local universities. This article focuses primarily on the
activities of Islamist-orientated students at the al-Najah University in Nablus,
and at the Islamic University of Gaza. Paz ascribes the increased militancy of
Islamists in the West Bank to the influx of Islamist students into the universities
of the West Bank. In conclusion he claims that institutions of higher learning in
the Territories were crucial to the development of Islamist groups such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Keywords: Keywords: Islamists, universities, morality
Rekhess, E. (1990). The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the
Gaza Strip. The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World. D. Menashri (ed).
Boulder, San Fransisco & Oxford, Westview Press: 189-206.
This essays sets out to explore the ideological links between the militant
Sunni Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Shiite revolutionary regime of Iran. The
author traces Islamic Jihad's views on martyrdom and self-sacrifice back to
concepts in Twelver Shi'ism. In the writings and statements of the ideologues of
Islamic Jihad, Iran becomes a model, since it advocates Islam, rather than
nationalism, as the solution to the Palestinian problem. However, the notions
adopted by Islamic Jihad from Shi'ism have not been worked into a coherent
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and explicit ideology. Rekhess suggests that this has to do with the fact that
Islamic Jihad consists of different groupings, whose ideological affinities are
divided between the doctrines of the Iranian revolution, of Sayyid Qutb, and
those of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement. According to the author, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement recruited extensively among PLO prisoners
in Israeli prisons, and has often co-operated with factions of the secular-
nationalist Fatah. Whereas Islamic Jihad focuses on jihad in a more restrictive
sense, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to stress the non-military and
non-violent aspects of the concept.
Keywords: Islamic Jihad, Shi'ism, Iran, Fatah
Robinson, G. E. (1997). Building a Palestinian State: the Incomplete
Revolution. Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press.
Chapter VI in this book deals with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamists.
The author describes the 1980s as a period of deepening Islamisation of
Palestinian society, evidenced by the proliferation of mosques and Islamic
institutions on the West Bank and in Gaza. He links the shift towards a
religious view of the conflict on the Palestinian side to the ascent to power of
the right-wing Likud Party in Israel in 1977. Robinson distinguishes between
two "types of Muslim cadres" encompassed by the Islamist movement: the first
socially conservative and quietist, the second activist. As a result of the first
intifada, the latter group of cadres revolted against their traditional leaders in
the Muslim Brotherhood and formed Hamas, according to the author. He
claims that the appeal of Hamas after the Oslo Accords derived from the
failures of Fatah. The support for Hamas therefore came from Palestinians who
were disillusioned with the accords and their implementation, but not
necessarily religious. Contrary to common assumptions, Robinson states that
the universities were more important than the mosques in garnering support for
Hamas.
Keywords: Islamists, universities, Hamas
Roy, S. (1991). “The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and
Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip.” Journal of Palestine Studies 20(3): 58-
69.
In this article, the radicalisation of Palestinians in Gaza is linked to the
deterioration of living standards that was the result of the first Intifada and the
Gulf War crisis, and to the stalemate of the political process towards peace.
However, the author describes it as a misconception to believe that Hamas
commanded considerable support in the Gaza Strip at the time of writing, and
notes growing irritation among residents with Hamas' struggle against moral
and behavioural impropriety. She points out that these issues are not accorded
importance by Islamic Jihad. She warns that violence is becoming an
increasingly viable option for Palestinian residents in Gaza.
Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Gaza
Sahliyeh, E. (1995). Religious Fundamentalisms Compared: Palestinian
Islamists, Militant Libanese Shi'ites, and Radical Sikhs. Fundamentalisms
Comprehended. R. S. Appleby and M. E. Marty (eds). Chicago & London,
University of Chicago Press. V: 135-152.
C M I
27
In this essay, the author explores common features of these seemingly
divergent movements. He sees the development of fundamentalism among these
groups as a response to processes of secularisation and modernisation, and
emphasises the strong nationalist overtone of all of them. In the case of Hamas,
Sahliyeh points to deteriorating economic conditions in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories in the 1980s, manifested in a significant decline in the
number of Palestinians working in agriculture. The author maintains that the
secular political movements that preceded Hamas were inconclusive, insensitive
to the political and economic grievances of its followers inside the Occupied
Territories, and neglectful of developmental issues. This in turn created a
psychological gulf between the urban elite, the rural population and the
population in the refugee camps, which combined to contribute to the rise of
fundamentalism. He also stresses the charismatic leadership of sheikh Yasin as
a factor accounting for the popularity of Hamas. According to the author,
nationalism in Hamas came at the expense of Islamic universalism. The
propensity for violence in the case of Hamas is regarded as a reaction to
governmental actions and policies.
Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, fundamentalism
Shadid, M. K. (1988). “The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank
and Gaza.” Third World Quarterly 10(2): 658-682.
The author surveys the development of the Muslim Brotherhood
Movement in the West Bank and Gaza in the period between 1946 and 1987.
Shadid notes that the Muslim Brotherhood in these two areas has separate
organisational structures, and that authority in the movement is decentralised,
with decisions being taken collectively by local leadership. The participating
members of the Muslim Brotherhood primarily consist of college and high
school students. Most members have a rural background, originate in the
lower-income groups and are young, whereas the leadership mainly comes from
urban areas and has an upper-middle income background. The latter tend to be
heavily involved in commerce. Funding for the Muslim Brotherhood derives
from the collection of tithes, zakat, locally and in the Gulf states, and from state
support from Saudi Arabia. According to the author the Muslim Brotherhood's
strategy for assuming power in Palestinian society involves two phases: one, the
transformation of the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza into an
Islamic society and two, the call for a holy struggle against Israel. Shadid
regards the increased importance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestinian
society as the outcome of efforts by the USA and Israel to weaken the
nationalist movement (the PLO), and claims that it poses a potential threat to
mass support for the nationalist movement.
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, the PLO
Sh'hada, N. Y. (1999). Gender and Politics in Palestine: Discourse Analysis of
the Palestinian Authority and Islamists. The Hague, Institute of Social Studies
(ORPAS): 88.
The author describes the Palestinian Islamists' reaction to the Palestinian
Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (MP), a group established in
Gaza in 1997. The group's aim was to bring about a modification of Palestinian
Family Law in order to correct its discriminatory nature. The author regards
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Hamas as an expression of popular discontent with the autocratic style and the
poor performance of the Palestinian Authority. She suggests that Hamas is an
entity created by Israel. Sh'hada claims that the rationale behind the Islamists'
attack on the MP is that any attempt at modifying the Family Law is perceived
as a challenge to national and religious identity. Furthermore, she argues that
the Palestinian women's movement cannot perceive the PA or the Islamists as
allies, since even the PA has appropriated an Islamist discourse. The author's
description of the Islamists' response to the MP indicates that the Palestinian
women's movement's demands were seen as Western and contrary to Islam.
Sh'hada believes that the PA's initial support for the MP was based exclusively
on a wish to satisfy its external funders. In conclusion, she asserts that the
Palestinian Islamists' ultimate goal is not the destruction of the peace process,
but rather to reassert Islamic culture as the predominant feature of Palestinian
society. She sees no significant difference between the PA and the Islamists as
far as women's rights are concerned.
Keywords: Islamists, PA,MP, women's rights
Shikaki, K. (1998). “Peace Now or Hamas Later.” Foreign Affairs 77(4): 29-
43.
The author presents survey data on Palestinian perceptions of the peace
process. He argues that even if the Islamists have no consistent demographic
characteristics, the strongest support for the Islamist opposition comes from
illiterates and educated youth. Palestinian students in particular are less likely to
renounce terror against Israeli targets. Shikaki claims that the election of
Benyamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister in 1996 created a climate of
distrust between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities. He suggests that the
two-steps approach of the Oslo Process (which implied the postponement of
problematic political issues until final status negotiations) generated a problem
by raising expectations on both sides. Thus, when disillusionment with the
peace process set in, it created a constituency for terror. The author concludes
that the Netanyahu administration has the choice of "dealing with the PLO
today, or with Hamas tomorrow".
Keywords: Islamists, Oslo peace process
Shikaki, K. (2002). “Palestinians Divided.” Foreign Affairs 81(4): 89-105.
The Al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000, was the response
of the "young guard" in the Palestinian nationalist movement (notably, Fatah)
to the stalled peace process, and to the failure of the PLO's "old guard" to
deliver on the promise of Palestinian independence and good governance.
According to the author, the "young guard" of the nationalist movement
consists of local leaders from the first Intifada. Like the Islamists, with whom
they have entered into a tactical alliance, the "young guard" does not regard
negotiations with Israel as a necessity. The motivations behind their alliance
with the Islamists were to avoid the creation of parallel institutions and
leadership by the Islamists, as occurred during the first intifada. Shikaki notes
that support for the Islamists, which waned throughout the peace process, has
risen dramatically in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and predicts that a
continuation of the current Palestinan-Israeli impasse is likely to benefit the
Palestinian Islamists.
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Keywords: Al-Aqsa Intifada, Islamists, PA, Fatah
Strindberg, A. (2000). “The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: a
Primer.” Journal of Palestine Studies 29(3): 60-76.
This article explores the history, purpose and activities of the Damascus-
based Alliance of Palestinian Forces, as well as the histories, ideologies and
interrelationships of the member factions. The alliance was established in 1993
in response to the Oslo Accord. The ten factions of the alliance include Islamic
Jihad and Hamas. According to Strindberg, the alliance's aim is to derail the
peace process. The principal sponsors of the alliance are Syria and Iran. Syria
sponsors and hosts the alliance as a means through which to influence
Palestinian issues and in order to destabilise Arafat. The alliance's main
function is to co-ordinate rhetoric.
The novelty of this alliance was that the Islamists were brought into alignment
with secular and leftist nationalists for the first time in Palestinian history. For
the Islamists, one motivation for taking part in the alliance was to be able to
dispel the historical reservations about their national commitment. The
alliance's main constituency is the refugees. The Damascene leadership of
Hamas is opposed to the moderation of Hamas leaders in Gaza, and Strindberg
indicates that this reflects the differing interests of the diaspora and the local
Palestinians.
Keywords: Islamists, the Damascus Alliance, Hamas, Islamic Jihad
Taraki, L. (1990). The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian
Uprising. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation. Z.
Lockman and J. Beinin (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris: 171-177.
Taraki emphasises the role of Israeli and foreign media in promoting
Hamas as a rival to the PLO in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. She
regards the establishment of Hamas as an attempt to rehabilitate the Muslim
Brotherhood as a credible political force, after decades of conflict with
Palestinian nationalist forces and absence from anti-occupation activities.
Hamas' views on the territorial issue is likened to that of religious Zionism,
inasmuch as both regard the territory as a divine trust granted exclusively to
them. Taraki is sceptical about the prospect of mobilising Palestinians around a
strategy for liberating all of historical Palestine, and suggests that Hamas'
chances of gaining support will be slim if a political process gains momentum.
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Israel
Usher, G. (1997). The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority [an
interview with Bassam Jarrar]. Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report.
J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris Publishers: 335-
339.
This interview with Bassam Jarrar, an Islamist thinker with links to
Hamas, based in Ramallah, was made in March 1994. Jarrar outlines the
Islamist movement's stance with regard to the Palestinian Authority and the
peace process. From Jarrar's point of view, participation in self-rule is not
possible, since it lends legitimacy to the peace process. He emphasises, however,
that the Islamist movement has no desire for confrontation with the PA as long
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as it respects the demands of Islamists with regard to the curricula of
Palestinian schools and Personal Status Law.
Keywords: Jarrar, Oslo peace process, PA
Usher, G. (1997). Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political
Independence After Oslo. London & Chicago, Pluto Press.
Chapter 3 of this book bears the title The Islamist Challenge and deals
with the Palestinian Islamists' (mainly Hamas') response to the DoP. Usher
implies that Hamas' armed policy in the wake of the DoP was tactical, rather
than wholly destructive. Therefore, according to the author, Hamas' aim was
less the destruction of the Oslo Accords than to assert an Islamist social agenda
for Palestinian civil society. Usher emphasises that political Islam in the
Palestinian context is homogeneous in terms neither of its constituency nor of
its aims. He claims that most of the support for Hamas is drawn from socially
conservative sectors in Palestinian society, for whom the PLO's secular
nationalism is an apology for materialism, corruption and the moral
permissiveness of the region's political elites. The 'red line' for Hamas therefore
is infringement of the freedom of expression of religious points of view in all
spheres of public life, and attempts at infringing the status of Islamic courts in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. A younger generation of cadres has
infused Hamas with nationalism; the question is whether the alliance between
these forces can hold over time.
Keywords: Hamas, Islamists, Oslo Accords
Usher, G. (1997). What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied
Territories. Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report. J. Beinin and J.
Stork (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris Publishers: 339-354.
The author portrays the Islamist movement in the Palestinian Occupied
Territories in the 1970s as a culturalist and social movement that was
supported by Israel as a means by which support for the PLO among
Palestinians could be eroded. He points to the fact that in contradistinction to
the PLO-backed popular committees of the first Intifada, Hamas was only
declared illegal by Israeli forces two years into the revolt. Usher describes the
establishment of Hamas as the result of the dilemma between continued
accommodation with the Israeli occupation and losing the Palestinian streets.
He suggests that the bulk of Hamas' support is drawn from the socially
conservative sectors of Palestinian society, for whom the reproduction of the
patriarchal Palestinian family through shari'a rule over personal status is
crucial. However, the author emphasises that Palestinian support for Hamas is
not the result of a turning towards faith, but rather the consequence of a
political and ideological crisis generated by the PLO's inadequate leadership
and the questions of the social agenda of any future Palestinian polity. It is
suggested that Hamas will flourish as long as Palestinian nationalists avoid
addressing this crisis.
Keywords: Islamists, PLO
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